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Abstract 
 Donald Davidson’s concept of “anomalous monism” is not nearly as well known as his related 
attack on the idea of “conceptual schemes,” though they are closely related. Th is concept, I shall 
argue, has several important implications for the study of religion. In particular, it implies that, 
as an account of mind and language, “cognitive science” is going to be of limited interest. More-
over, and that approaches to the study of religion based on models drawn from cognitive science 
are likely to be “degenerate research programmes.” If this is so, then we can reasonably marginal-
ize such programmes to the extent that they compete with more promising projects. 
 Keywords 
 Davidson, Churchland, Lawson & McCauley, cognitive science, ritual, theories and methods, 
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 In the August 2005 issue of Gourmet, Fuschia Dunlop recounts her attempt to 
introduce “three outstanding chefs from Sichuan province, a heartland of Chi-
nese gastronomy” (2005: 62), to one of the temples of contemporary American 
cooking, Th omas Keller’s French Laundry in California’s Napa Valley. Much to 
her chagrin, however, these sophisticated Chinese chefs are mostly appalled by 
the weird and barbaric foods put before them. By the third day, “they choose to eat 
in a notoriously bad Chinese restaurant rather than brave another fine by West-
ern meal,” and it is only when they secure a rice-cooker for a simple stir-fry that 
she sees them “happy and relaxed” (64). I suppose that this is a common enough 
experience, but it is also one that instantiates what Donald Davidson calls 
“anomalous monism.” Davidson has figured in the philosophy of religion since 
the mid-1970s, particularly in discussions of rationality, relativism, and concep-
tual schemes. His “anomalous monism,” however, has received less comment. 
Th is is unfortunate because, as I will argue in what follows, when anomalous 
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monism is properly understood it provides good reasons for suspecting that 
“cognitive science” and its allied projects are, in a phrase derived from Imre 
Lakatos, “degenerate research programmes” (1978: 5).1 Dunlop’s gastronomical 
contre-temps, in other words, points up a moral about the study of human 
beings and their institutions that students of religion would do well to heed, if 
only because it will contribute to the time they can spend outside the library, 
engaging the various forms of food, literature, sex, politics, and religion, that 
make us want to keep living our little lives and putting off the big sleep. 
 From Rational Choice to the Emergence of Th ought 
 Th ough he became well known in the 1960s for his writings on action and 
philosophy of language, most of Donald Davidson’s earliest published work 
was in formal decision theory. Reflecting on that work in 1997, Davidson 
writes that: 
 Decision theory is often derided as a false description of how people actually act . . . As 
a description of actual behavior, decision theory seems false because there is no com-
pletely satisfactory way to test it; the test always depends on exactly how the theory is 
given empirical application. Nevertheless, the theory answers to our intuitions about 
how actual decisions are made; in effect it simply spells out our commonsense appara-
tus for explaining intentional action (Davidson 2001: 126). 
 Rational action is explained in terms of intentions. Intentions incorporate 
views about the way the world is, the way the agent would like it to be, and 
the various ways in which the agent might bring about the desired state of 
affairs. While we rarely articulate all of this in detail, what Davidson means by 
our “common sense apparatus” comes out when we look back on the actions 
of others and when we contemplate what we’re going to do for dinner. Imag-
ine the following exchange: 
 “I hear George and Martha are divorcing.” 
 “Why?” 
 “I guess Martha can’t take it anymore, what with George’s bitterness, the constant 
mind-games, and the drinking.” 
 Or consider the following: 
1  Although I use Lakatos’ term, I am not committed to his account of scientific rationality. 
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 “What should we do for dinner?” 
 “I don’t know. We had roast beef yesterday. Given the temperature, Japanese sounds 
good.” 
 “Should we order in?” 
 “Not Japanese! Th e yellowtail is warm and the eel loses its crispness. Let’s go to 
Koji’s.” 
 “Good enough.” 
 Th ere is nothing complex going on in either case. Th ere is a situation that 
calls, in the first case, for explanation, and in the second for resolution. Th ey 
both move to statements of fact that are also loaded with judgments of com-
parative value. In explaining Martha’s decision it goes without saying that 
George’s bitterness makes him cruel and unpleasant to be around, that their 
drinking reinforces resentfulness and cruelty, detracts from their ability to 
keep from lashing out, and that the mind-games, while perhaps not as bad as 
physical abuse (though I’m not sure about this), amount to a form of co-
dependent torture. Given the awfulness of the situation, Martha’s filing for 
divorce seems pretty reasonable. Th e case of dinner works pretty much the 
same way. 
 Note that the accounts of the decisions we attribute to Martha and our 
unnamed pair are neither fool-proof nor logically compelled. More evidence 
could tip the scale against Martha’s decision or against going to Koji’s. Th is 
evidence could be about facts or preferences, but any explanation or resolution 
will have to have some combination of both because, “we all, whether we 
think about it or not, make our decisions in terms of how we weigh the values 
of various possible outcomes of our actions, and how likely we think one or 
another course of action is to attain those values” (Davidson 2001: 126). A 
decision that took no account of the way the world is would be irrational; one 
that ignored preferences would be inhuman. 
 It’s worth reflecting on the last half of the last sentence because it was meant 
literally, not as a rhetorical gesture. “If a mouse had vocal cords of the right 
sort,” writes Davidson, “you could train it to say ‘Cheese’. But that word 
would not have a meaning when uttered by the mouse, nor would the mouse 
understand what it ‘said’” (2001: 127). Th e counterfactual mouse in question 
would be doing nothing more than responding to a stimulus. For a word to 
have meaning or, what amounts to the same thing, for a sequences of noises 
to express a belief, it must be part of a practice of communication, at least 
one part of the goal of which must be that the speaker intend that any second-
person hearers grasp the point of the speaker’s attempt to communicate. Cen-
tral to the practice of communication are the beliefs that there are second 
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persons with whom to communicate and that they are similarly causally related 
to a shared world. Without the second person as the object of a communica-
tive intention it is impossible to understand what it would mean to convey 
propositional content. And without the second person’s responses to that com-
municated content it is impossible to generate the notion of truth. For truth 
appears when we move beyond the simple stimulus responses of the mouse to 
the more complex case of attempting to share some bit of propositional con-
tent with somebody else. Th e first-person responses of adult humans would 
only be so many grunts and groans without “the interaction of at least two 
speaker-interpreters, for,” Davidson argues, “there would be no saying what a 
speaker was talking or thinking about, no basis for claiming he could locate 
objects in an objective space and time, without interaction with a second per-
son” (2001: 121).2 
 It’s important to keep in mind that Davidson is not proposing an account 
of the history of the development of language. Th e requirement of a second 
person simply illustrates the inherently social aspect of language and thought. 
“Success in communicating propositional contents,” he writes, “is what we 
need to understand before we ask about the nature of meaning or of language” 
(Davidson 2005: 120). Talking about language and thought presupposes the 
kind of interaction Davidson calls “triangulation.” Triangulation is seen where 
any two or more agents interact with the world and with each other in response 
to some fact about the world. “One sees this in its simplest form,” he notes, 
“in a school of fish, where each fish reacts almost instantaneously to the 
motions of the others. Th is is apparently a reaction that is wired in” (2001: 
128). In some, more complex, creatures, triangulation results from learned 
reactions, as when certain monkeys (he doesn’t say which), “make three distin-
guishable sounds depending on whether they see a snake, an eagle, or a lion 
approaching” (2001: 128). If it were a matter of just the individual monkey, 
distinguishing the various sounds would be pointless, but the variation is tied 
to what we can only call a form of cooperative interaction: Climbing a tree is 
more appropriate to lion evasion than running, for example; hiding works 
better against something that hunts by sight from a distance. How monkeys 
2  Davidson is aware that he is getting at the same point about language made by Wittgenstein 
in his critique of the very idea of a private language. But the “private language argument” has, in 
the last 50 years, become so convoluted as to make wading in counterproductive. Several canon-
ical early examples of the confusion are reprinted in Pitcher 1966. As Davidson sees it, the situ-
ation was hardly improved by Saul Kripke’s 1982 reading of Wittgenstein. In many of his essays 
of the 1990s and early 2000s Davidson decides that the better part of valor is to “leave Wittgen-
stein out of this; I’ll just say Kripkenstein” (2005: 119). 
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learn this, and how they have managed to pass this on across generations, I 
haven’t the faintest idea. Th at it is purposeful seems clear. 
 Nonetheless, Davidson goes on to insist, this behavior “cannot be due to 
propositional beliefs, desires, or intentions, nor does their mode of communi-
cation constitute a language.” (2001, 128) Why not? To attribute beliefs, 
desires, or intentions to an agent requires that we be able to identify the prop-
ositional content of those beliefs and the like, and be able to attribute under-
standing that content to the agent involved. Otherwise we have nothing more 
than stimulus and response, in the manner of the fish. While it may not be the 
only ground, one of the surest is the ability of the agent to notice errors. Th us, 
writes Davidson: 
 It is when one has learned to say or to think, ‘Th at looks green,’ ‘Th at man seems 
small,’ ‘I thought it was an oasis,’ when one has said or thought that something blue 
was green, or that the large man in the distance was small, or that what looked like an 
oasis was a mirage, that one has truly mastered the distinction between appearance and 
reality, between believing truly and believing falsely (2004: 145). 
 Th e monkeys may make mistakes, but unless they can provide an account of 
exactly what mistake they made, we don’t have adequate grounds for attribut-
ing propositional content to their noises. Without content, no language—and 
without language, no beliefs, desires, or intentions—can reasonably be attrib-
uted to anyone or anything.3  
 Conceptual Schemes, Rationality, and Truth 
 Davidson’s essay “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme” was, as he put it, 
“slow to reach its present form” (Davidson 1984: xi). First presented as a John 
Locke lecture in 1970, it was subsequently reformulated as his presidential 
address to the American Philosophical Association in 1973.4 “Conceptual 
3  Davidson recognizes, with equanimity, that this means that not only fish, but monkeys, 
whales, dolphins, and infants don’t make it into the language-using community (see 2001: 
127-128; 2004: 135-138). Yet, he seems to draw no particular moral conclusions from this and 
plainly from the fact alone that some groups of animals don’t make it into the community of 
language-users nothing at all follows about how we should treat them. 
4  Many of us, however, first encountered the argument in Richard Rorty’s 1972 paper “Th e 
World Well Lost.” Rorty documents his debt to Davidson in note four of this paper, as reprinted 
in Rorty (1982: 17). Davidson’s essay has been oft reprinted. Both essays are brought together to 
explicate rationality by Jeffrey Stout (1981: chap. 8). Further developments along this line may 
be found in Godlove (1989). 
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relativism,” writes Davidson, “is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we 
could make good sense of it. Th e trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard 
to improve intelligibility while retaining the excitement” (1984: 183). It is 
exotic because it seems to claim that there are whole worlds of human experi-
ence inhabited by some but completely inaccessible to other members of the 
species.5 Th e world of the Inuit or the Yanomami, we’re asked to believe, is 
qualitatively different from our own. 
 But when we go on to ask how they might be different, the exotic tends to 
pale. “Whorf,” writes Davidson, “wanting to demonstrate that Hopi incorpo-
rates a metaphysics so alien to ours that Hopi and English cannot, as he puts 
it, ‘be calibrated,’ uses English to convey the contents of sample Hopi sen-
tences” (1984: 184). Th e excitement, to grasp for an analogy, seems to come 
from saying that some peoples see the world like Renoir and others like 
Cezanne or Perugino, or Hiroshige. But when we try to explicate this, it either 
turns out to mean the very improbable (e.g., “the world they see looks to them 
like their paintings look to us”) or the very uninteresting (e.g., “Cezanne paints 
mountains differently from the way they are painted by Perugino or Hiro-
shige”). Th e former is improbable because paintings are macro-sized composi-
tions on which the artist has chosen to distribute line and color in various ways 
depending on style and desired effect, while the visual field, if we want to talk 
that way, and the neurophysics of sight don’t seem to work that way. Th e latter 
is philosophically uninteresting because it is perfectly intelligible and ulti-
mately no more inaccessible than a good art history textbook. When Joshua 
Taylor writes of a Perugino crucifixion that “Each of these schemes would be 
quite possible, but the effect of the pictures, their expressive content, would be 
very different,” (Taylor 1957: 48) nothing is hidden; he draws the figures and 
discusses why he believes that different compositional choices would have had 
different impacts on viewers. 
 If “different conceptual schemes” turns out to mean “different beliefs about 
the world and how it works,” the philosophical excitement pales even more. 
Most of us expect people to differ from us in at least some of their beliefs, 
particularly over time and distance. It’s only if we came to believe that a group 
of people differed greatly from us in their beliefs at another time and place that 
we would be excited once again; maybe on food, politics or sexual interests, 
but not, we’re inclined to think, on the nuts and bolts of a world we navigate 
5  I am bracketing, for the time being, any questions about the non-human. Davidson and I 
agree that it is difficult to make sense of nonhuman experience, but the argument against that is 
merely an extension of the argument rehearsed in what follows. 
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together day by day. Were someone to be sitting here in my office and not 
discern the books, the computers, the assistant in the outer office, and the 
various plants on my window sill, I would be very puzzled. Were he a non-
English speaker, our conversation about them might be pretty rudimentary, 
but that’s a different subject. Were he either an English speaker, or a speaker of 
one of the languages I can negotiate, and make odd pronouncements about 
the things in and around my office, that would be the most puzzling thing of 
all. After a couple of odd remarks—“Who walks this dog when you’re on vaca-
tion,” say, spoken as we examine my begonias—I would have to question 
either my grasp of the language, his grasp of the language, or the sanity of one 
of us. But to give one up is to give up the notion of alternative conceptual 
schemes entirely. 
 Th is might seem a quick jump, but it isn’t. Bad Latin isn’t an alternative 
conceptual space; it’s just bad Latin. And being nuts isn’t an alternative scheme; 
it’s some form of psychopathology. To pin down the idea of a “conceptual 
scheme” requires that we articulate a dualism of scheme and content that 
makes room for undifferentiated input, a scheme that organizes that input, 
and the content which results from that organizing activity. But this, as David-
son notes, is “a dogma of empiricism, the third dogma. Th e third, and perhaps 
the last, for if we give it up it is not clear that there is anything distinctive left 
to call empiricism” (1984, 189). If “post-analytic philosophy” means anything 
when applied to Davidson and Brandom (I have my doubts about McDow-
ell), it groups them in a set of philosophers trained by the heirs of Russell and 
Carnap to believe that there was something like a scientific method which 
could be philosophically distilled into something called “logical empiricism” 
and who subsequently came to believe that this empiricism, as a philosophical 
doctrine, was no better off than the approaches it had displaced.6 Th is didn’t 
6  Versions of this story have become legion in the last quarter century and more. Richard 
Rorty (P.A. Phil) laid much of the documentary foundation for it in Th e Linguistic Turn, his 
introduction to which is a precursor to the more expansive story told in Philosophy and the Mir-
ror of Nature. Both are reflections on the methodological, or metaphilosophical, moves under-
taken to quell the “disgust” experienced by the likes of Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, and 
Wittgenstein “at the spectacle of philosophers quarreling endlessly over the same issues.” (Rorty 
ed. 1967, 1) But Rorty’s version of the story goes even further back, to his earliest article, where 
he writes that “a little empiricism, plus a passion for rigor, will make a man a nominalist. Th ink-
ing about the antinomies created by the mutual repugnance of experience and rigor will drive 
him, if he things as long and as hard as Peirce and Wittgenstein did, to something quite different” 
(Rorty 1961: 198). By the end of his life, I believe, Davidson also maintained something close 
to this version of the story, though sustaining that interpretation of Davidson would be a com-
plicated undertaking. Let it suffice to note one remark from the mid-1990s: “Rorty says that, 
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mean that logic or science was bunk, only that they could not play the role of 
undisputed intellectual arbiter their proponents believed they could play. 
Wittgenstein, first an icon then a critic of analytic philosophy, puts it suc-
cinctly when he writes that, “if language is to be a means of communication 
there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may 
sound) in judgments” (Wittgenstein 1958: 242). Th ese judgments are only 
intelligible because, “the common behaviour of mankind is the system of ref-
erence by means of which we interpret an unknown language” (Wittgenstein 
1958: 206). If we must agree in judgments, and if our common behavior is the 
“system of reference,” then there is no neutral high ground for logic or the sci-
ences to inhabit. 
 Th ere is also no place for conceptual schemes. If most of our judgments 
must agree, then most of our judgments must be true. Otherwise it would be 
impossible for us to negotiate the world we share. And if we mostly agree 
about a world we share, then the exotic sounding “alternative conceptual 
schemes” can only be shorthand for the mundane “judgments about which we 
disagree.” Given the multiple ways that groups of people attempt to interpret 
the world and each other, we should expect disagreement even within the 
same group. Th ese disagreements manifest themselves in what some interlocu-
tors experience as anomalous utterances; for instance: “I am a black cockatoo,” 
“the sin-offering shall be slaughtered before the LORD in the place where 
the whole-offering is slaughtered,” “we can assume that the device PD con-
tains a recursive specification of a set of pairs (S,P), where S is a signal and P is 
a percept . . .” Th is is pretty arcane stuff, but it doesn’t help much in under-
standing that these remarks are made by people inhabiting different concep-
tual schemes. What we need to do is learn something about Australian religion 
(Durkheim 1995), the Torah of Israel (Leviticus 6:25), or Chomsky’s approach 
to linguistics (Chomsky 1963). We might not agree in every detail with any of 
the people disposed to talk in these ways, but because we share an understand-
ing of how people generally respond to the promptings of the world around 
them, we can come, with enough study, to understand why they talk the way 
properly interpreted, my message to the skeptic is to ‘tell him to get lost’, thus aligning myself 
with the later Wittgenstein or the early Heidegger. I am now inclined to go along with Rorty” 
(Davidson 2004: 6). It should be clear that I, too, am inclined to go along Rorty, but it’s only fair 
to say that this version has had its critics. Without trying to sort the issues out here, it’s worth 
taking a look at Dummett (1993) for the Continental roots, Baker (1996) for a view of Wittgen-
stein as passeé, and Soames (2003) for an insider’s guide, none of which could be said to portray 
philosophy as “post-analytic.” For an historian’s take on Rorty’s place in the oddysey of American 
philosophy see Kuklick (2001). All these volumes can direct the reader to still other versions of 
the story. 
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they do.7 Th is means that we can, at least in principle, come to understand 
what people say and write, thus what they desire and value, in a shared world 
about which most people, most of the time, hold mostly true beliefs. 
 From Triangulation to Anomalous Monism 
 If explaining rational action requires attributing language to the agents, with 
the full panoply of beliefs, intentions, and desires, what about interpreting 
language? From at least the early 1970s, Davidson has insisted that “the prob-
lem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign . . . All understanding of the 
speech of another involves radical translation” (Davidson 1984: 125). Th e 
domestic case risks misleading us because we usually take for granted two of 
the components in understanding someone with whom we share a language. 
Nonetheless, interpretation involves a triangulation of some stimulus, causally 
connected to my world, the response I am inclined to make as a result, and the 
response that some other individual is inclined to make to the same stimulus. 
Imagine, for instance, that my kids and I are strolling through the mall. My 
daughter Rosalie peels off to investigate some earrings while Grady and I con-
tinue on to the food court. After awhile I get tired of waiting and start to get 
up to find her, but before I can Grady exclaims, “Th ere she comes.” Because 
we share a language and an interest in this particular person showing up, it 
doesn’t occur to me either to worry about what his words mean or the particu-
lar stimulus to which he is responding; I simply scan the general direction in 
which he’s looking, pick out the tallish, long-haired girl in question, and 
respond, “it’s about time.” But the fact that I take his use of language and the 
7  For spelling out the way in which talking and reasoning and acting hang together it may well 
be, as Jeff Stout maintains, that Brandom’s “inferentialism” is more illuminating than Davidson’s 
approach (Stout 2002: 45). Th e reason for this, I think, lies in the way Brandom weaves observa-
tion and action into the complex of linguistic phenomena by explaining them in terms of “discur-
sive entry” and “discursive exit” moves (Brandom 2000: 83). Th is allows the pragmatics of 
discourse—talking—to be an object of straight forward natural study out of which can emerge a 
clearly connected account of experience and action without any antecedent invocation of sense-
data, stimuli, or other problematic notions. Giving reasons becomes a matter of making explicit 
the commitments of a particular player in a complex social game. Justifying reasons can then be 
done in terms of entry and exit moves. What you end up with is a methodological monism that 
is complex but theoretically unified. But I’m inclined to agree with Stout that the differences 
between them “are mainly verbal” (2002: 44). Since I’m going to make much of Davidson’s 
“anomalous monism,” it seems prudent to stick with Davidson and defer to Stout’s sense that 
what Davidson does can also be accomplished with equal if not greater elegance by Brandom. 
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stimulus that provoked it for granted doesn’t eliminate them as components of 
interpretation. 
 It turns out that this seemingly simple bit of interpretation carries with it 
some important implications. I need to have a grasp of adverbs, pronouns, and 
verbs. I need to know that of all the relevant females that “he” might pick out, 
the only one Grady cares about at the moment is Rosalie. I must know that 
“Th ere comes Rosalie” is true only if there comes Rosalie and that Grady 
believes, probably on the basis of a simple perception, that “Th ere comes 
Rosalie” is true. Finally, I must believe that Grady intends to communicate 
this belief to me. 
 Th e situation is basically no different if I am interpreting a string of noises 
produced by a person I don’t know in a language I don’t know; it just takes 
more work. I assume that the previously unknown speaker of a hitherto unen-
countered language is the same sort of creature that I am, that he is causally 
connected to the world pretty much the same way that I am, and that the 
noises constitute a speech-act by which he intends to communicate something 
to me about the world around us. And this remains part of the background 
even when my translation turns out to miss the point. David Carrasco tells 
this story about an early Spanish encounter with the natives of the “Land of 
the Turkey and Deer:” 
 Attempting to figure out their location the Spaniards shouted, “What is this place 
called?” Th e natives replied, “Uic athan,” meaning, “We do not understand your 
words.” In an ironic turn of meaning characteristic of many changes that were to fol-
low, the Spaniards decided to call this area Yucatan, a place name that is now the per-
manent designation for this eastern part of Mesoamerica (Carrasco 1990: 1). 
 Th e story is told, at least in part, to illustrate both the hubris of the Spaniards 
and “inventions and fantasies,” they concocted about this “‘strange new world’ 
with different languages, customs, symbols, cuisines, philosophies, manners, 
and landscapes” (Carrasco 1990: 2). However, it also illustrates the impor-
tance of Davidson’s method of solving the problem of “the interdependence of 
belief and meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving 
for meaning. Th is is accomplished by assigning truth conditions to alien sen-
tences that make native speakers right when plausibly possible, according, of 
course, to our own view of what is right” (Davidson 1984: 137). In radical 
interpretation we have to start with our views because those are the only ones 
we have. Th e Spaniards lept a little too soon in supposing that “Uic athan” was 
an answer to “¿Como se llama este lugar?” or however they put it, but within 
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a few decades, their heirs recognized the mistake and called them to account.8 
Presumably the knowledge of Nahuatl was the result of making native speak-
ers right when plausibly possible. 
 Because meaning and belief are so closely interwoven, radical interpretation 
requires that we attribute beliefs to the speakers we are trying to interpret. And 
because we must make those beliefs correlate with ours, we naturally correlate 
the meanings of their utterances with those we are disposed to use in the situ-
ation. Imagine going into a pharmacy in a country whose language you read 
pretty well—Spain, for example—but which you don’t regularly use. What 
you want is something like Neosporin and some bandages to use on blisters 
you have inflicted on yourself through overly avid sight-seeing. You might try 
a couple of things, rejecting the pharmacist’s suggestions. After the barbaric 
“unguenta antibiotica” (you’re hoping that “unquent” has a Spanish analog) he 
grabs a small rectangular box that reads “Terramicina: Pomada Topica.” “Eso 
es!” you respond, not quite ideomatically, but he gets it, smiles, and rings up a 
few Euros. Th is is the sort of triangulation with which we are all familiar. 
 As we make the small triangulating steps toward securing just the box we 
need, we are tacitly deploying a notion of “satisfaction” in determining whether 
or not a particular word or phrase adequately translates that of the other. To 
conclude that “pomada” translates “ointment” is to make a normative judg-
ment. It registers the newly formed belief that the one meets your standard for 
substituting for the other. But since our norms, and the ways we apply them, 
are unique to each individual, what we really work with are individual ide-
olects which are themselves judged adequate to count as versions of English or 
Spanish or Chinese. But a well travelled person is fully aware that the English 
of Australia differs from that of California, which differs from that of Massa-
chusetts. Consider the hoagie. Is it or is it not a sub? How about a grinder? Th e 
norms that govern what counts as a well formed statement are constantly in 
flux, even at the local level, and ever evolving at the state, national, and inter-
national levels. 
 Since use, meaning, and belief are in constant, if sometimes only glacial, 
motion, there can be no static, fixed, and total description of English or any 
other language. Since individuals evolve in their language use, there couldn’t 
8  Th ere are various versions of the story. Carrasco doesn’t cite the original for his, but one of 
the oldest, perhaps even the original, version is that of Motolinía, in part three, chapter eight of 
his History of the Indians of New Spain, written probably in 1541. Th ere he writes that, “speaking 
with the Indians of that coast, to what the Spaniards asked the Indians replied: “tectetán, tecte-
tán,” which means, “I don’t understand you, I don’t understand you” (Motolinía 1985, 332). 
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even be a complete description of a single ideolect. One implication of this is 
that there can be no general account of rationality that is not grossly simplistic. 
We’ve already seen Davidson make this point in a different guise discussing 
decision theory. Our theories of preference and rationality will always be rough 
and ready, or narrowed down for very specific purposes. If this is true, what’s 
now generally known as “cognitive science” is an implausible candidate for 
“science” if that is measured by the accepted standard of physics. For one of 
the criteria for a fully articulated physics is that it eliminate all normative judg-
ments in favor of a generalized account of the way the world works in terms 
of types of possible objects linked to events by formally specifiable laws. A 
physics that distinguished “proper” quarks from “defective” quarks would be 
seriously incomplete. What we want is an account that distinguishes all the 
possible variants from the others. We want a physics without ceteris paribus 
and similar clauses which leave open the possibility of non-commitment. And 
since psychology cannot pretend to the status of physics, Davidson’s monism 
is anomalous. 
 Th e fruit of artificial intelligence and recent neuroscience, cognitive science 
is the latest version of 19th and early 20th century positivism. While it comes 
in a variety of forms, the most elaborate account is that of Paul Churchland. 
Churchland’s position can be broken into three components: materialism, 
scientific progress, and the assault on what he calls “folk psychology.” It’s worth 
distinguishing these components in order to get clear about just where he and 
Davidson part company. While Davidson rarely, if ever, uses the term “mate-
rialism” for his position, his embrace of “monism” is intended to register the 
view that there is only one sort of stuff that enters into the causal relationships 
between ourselves and the rest of the world. Th e subject matter of physics, 
chemistry, and neurobiology is thus the same, only in increasingly compli-
cated relationships. Th e ganglia, dendrites, and other structures that allow 
impulses to be transmitted from my toe striking the chair, through the nerves 
to the brain, provoking a snarling epithet, are made up of the sorts of com-
pounds studied by organic chemists. Th e elements that make up organic com-
pounds are of the same sort as those occupying the rest of the periodic table, 
all of which are made up of the sorts of stuff studied by nuclear chemists and 
their compatriots in physics departments. If somebody wants to lump this 
altogether and call it “matter,” so be it, but the term is pointlessly argumenta-
tive, freighted as it is with the old-fashioned spirit/matter debate. We might as 
well use the more specific vocabulary of the latest science. 
 “Science” itself is a term usually itching for a fight. Since we abandoned its 
traditional meaning of “reasonably well defined body of knowledge about 
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some interesting subject of investigation,” the term has mostly been a club in 
academic turf wars and the scramble for funding. Historians of science, for the 
last hundred years, have told an ever more complicated tale about natural 
philosophy subdivided into the various fields that populate the science build-
ings of the contemporary academy, and in the process have convinced all but 
the most illiterate of their practitioners to abandon the notion that there is a 
single “scientific” method that offers a high road to the truth. Th is, of course, 
doesn’t mean that there is no progress in science. We know much more about 
the very largest and the very smallest parts of our universe today than we did 
fifty or a hundred years ago. Th is knowledge makes it possible for doctors and 
other practitioners of the engineering arts to do very useful things for us. Th ey 
can also do more destructive things to us, but all things considered I doubt 
many people would give up what we’ve learned in favor of some luddite uto-
pia. Of course, on this loose account, there has been progress in music, history, 
math, anthropology, and even philosophy in the last hundred years; it’s just 
that less of that progress has immediate engineering applications. 
 So it turns out that what separates Davidson from Churchland and other 
apostles of cognitive science is the status of “folk psychology.” By “folk psy-
chology” Churchland seems to mean the vocabulary made up of “desires, 
beliefs, fears, intentions, perceptions, and forth,” together with background 
laws that connect the vocabulary to particular explanations and predictions, 
as well as whatever ontology is presupposed by this complex (Churchland 
1981: 68). It is particularly important to describe this as a “theory” because it 
is then possible to insist that, as with psychological theories generally, it is only 
credible to the extent that “it is successful . . . over competing theories” 
(Churchland 1981: 69). If it turns out that folk psychology is not the best 
available explanation for the systematic interpretation of human behavior, 
then, despite its venerability, the appropriate scientific move is to jettison it in 
favor of its better challenger. Folk psychology, on this scenario, should go the 
way of Ptolemaic astronomy and Priestley’s phlogiston. 
 When Churchland looks to test the adequacy of folk psychology, he fixes on 
“the learning process itself, especially where it involves large-scale conceptual 
change, and especially as it appears in its prelinguistic or entirely nonlinguistic 
form (as in infants and animals), which is by far the most common form in 
nature” (Churchland 1981: 73). Churchland doesn’t quite explain how it is 
that folk psychology “founders on the fact that how to formulate, manipulate, 
and store a rich fabric of propositional attitudes is itself something that is 
learned” (Churchland 1981: 74), but the idea seems to be something like this. 
Most infants and non-human animals learn all sorts of things without being 
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able to talk. If learning involves accepting propositions and then forming dis-
positions to act on the basis of cumulative accepted propositional content, it 
becomes very hard to explain pre-linguistic learning. Not only that, but the 
mechanisms by which at least some of us come to replace one part of our 
accepted propositions and their associated dispositions with others remains 
opaque. When asked, for example, how it was that he became a Lutheran, my 
brother is likely to say, “Christianity seemed reasonable and my wife was 
already a Lutheran.” Th is may be true, but it doesn’t tell us much about the 
mechanisms of changing the mind or how those mechanisms are connected to 
our other cognitive commitments. 
 Churchland doesn’t offer much more by way of critique, either here or in 
his extensive body of work. Instead, he typically spends rather a lot of time 
presenting and defending the work of neuroscientists and formulating stories 
about what might be possible with the advance of brain research and its appli-
cations. If the two hemispheres of the human brain communicate, for exam-
ple, might it not be possible for two distinct brains to do so as well? “Suppose,” 
he asks us to imagine: 
 that we can fashion a workable transducer to convert a symphony of neural activity 
into (say) microwaves radiated from an aerial in the forehead, and to perform the 
reverse functions of converting received microwaves back into neural activation . . . 
Once the channel is opened between two or more people, they can learn (learn) to 
exchange information and coordinate their behavior with the same intimacy and vir-
tuosity displayed by your own hemispheres (Churchland 1981: 88). 
 However we feel about the prospect, there is no particular reason to deny that 
this neuro-intimacy might, someday, be possible. Th e relevant question is 
whether or not this would require that we jettison the propositional attitudes 
presupposed by folk psychology. 
 Davidson clearly thinks that we wouldn’t. Th e triangulation in which we 
engage when we attempt radical interpretation is inescapably normative and 
the normativity of interpretation implies either that the material vocabulary 
envisioned by Churchland will reproduce that normativity or that it will be 
inadequate to the sort of complete description his eliminative materialism 
requires. Central to Davidson’s argument is the disanalogy he perceives 
between linguistic and prelinguistic learning. In a late essay he writes that 
“Animals show by their behavior that they are making fine distinctions, and 
many of the things they discriminate we do too . . . but they do not perceive 
that anything is the case. Some non-human animals can learn a greal deal, but 
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they do not learn that something is true” (Davidson 2004: 136). Th e distinc-
tion is between responding to stimuli and making judgments about claims. 
Neither Davidson nor I want to deny that various animals, including 
humans—or whales or bonobos—learn to make fine distinctions from among 
their various stimuli and act on them. But there is no evidence any non-human 
responds to any stimulus with “that’s a Witchetty Grub,” much less “that’s a 
Witchetty Grub, which features prominently in the ritual life of the Arunta, 
an aboriginal people of Australia” (cf. Durkheim 1995: 338-354). Th is might 
seem a petty point were we not attempting to account for human behavior. 
Given that some people do (or at least did) make such classificatory judgements 
and then act on them, we need an account of action that can incorporate judg-
ments and reasons in explaining actions. 
 Churchland and similar thinkers are inclined to respond that strictly com-
putational, non-human, machines can be programmed to make classificatory 
judgments and act on them, thus suggesting the propositional attitudes David-
son thinks are crucial may, in fact, be dispensable. In a comparatively recent 
piece, for example, Churchland argues that it is possible to construct neuro-
networks which can agree on questions of similarity of input despite “highly 
idiosyncratic synaptic connections; a pair of networks with hidden-layer neu-
rons of quite different microcontents; a pair of networks whose input-output 
behaviors are nevertheless identical, because they are rooted in a common con-
ceptual framework embodied in the activation spaces of their respective hidden 
layers” (Churchland 1998: 11). But this is beside the point. Even theoretical 
machine design requires, in order to carry out whatever computations it does, 
some set of normative standards, and those standards are invariably supplied 
by the mature machine designer or programmer. Even then, different models 
will display idiosyncratic judgments about the similarity. When Churchland 
writes that “such idiosyncracies should not be seen as a defect of our artificial 
models. People, too, display peripheral divergences in how they judge close 
similarities,” he is missing the point (Churchland 1998: 18). Such idiosyncra-
cies are a function of divergent local standards, which are always explained by 
the anomalous and potentially unpredictable ways in which language is 
learned. 
 Color terms are a particularly clear case of the problem. If we confine our-
selves to a very broad division among the “primary” colors—red, yellow, and 
blue—it’s possible to define “secondary” colors as orange, green, and violet. 
Many of us might pre-reflectively assume that sorting objects by these colors 
is intuitively immediate: Th e sky is blue, the grass is green, ripe tomatoes 
are red, etc. But if we consider olive or taupe, things suddenly become more 
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 complicated. While I suppose it is possible to stipulate that such-and-such is 
taupe and that other such-and-such is olive, these are purely stipulative and 
subject to the usual disagreements. If there is ever a consensus, it will be no 
more than the enforced standard of a particular group at a particular point in 
time. But if that is true of these intermediate hues, it is no less true for the so-
called primary colors, if only because “absolutely pure hues do not exist in 
artists’ pigments” (Taylor 1957: 63). Nor are there pure hues in nature. 
 Or consider the following problematic situation. My friend Mark is mar-
ried to a woman with a serious problem; she is pathologically sensitive to 
capsaicin, the principal “pungent” component in the various species of chili 
pepper. What Mark and the kids consider mild, Sharon finds inedibly hot. 
Since Mark does most of the cooking and shopping, this puts considerable 
constraints on his planning for the week. It also limits the places they can go 
for dinner. If Mark wants to understand this sad situation, how might he pro-
ceed? One thing he can’t do is examine her sense-experiences, since this are 
indistinguishable from her reports and just tell him what he already knows. 
He might be interested in the biochemistry of pepper pungency. In doing so 
he will discover that the standard measure is named for Wilbur Scoville, who 
first devised the scale in the early twentieth century. In its contemporary form, 
refined by High Performance Liquid Chromatography, pure Capsaicin mea-
sures 16,000,000 Scoville units while a sweet Italian bell measures nothing 
much. Th e hottest pepper on record is a Habanero, measuring in at 577,000; 
the common Jalapeno runs from 2,500 to 10,000 Scoville units. So if he could 
induce Sharon to endure the testing, Mark might discover that his wife reacts 
to the Peperoncini, which Bosland and Votava describe as having “very little 
pungency or none at all” (Bosland & Votava 2000: 31), the way that he and 
the kids respond to a particularly piquant Piquin (50,000 SU). But this, of 
course, is only half the problem, because her response is unabashedly negative, 
while his is invigorating, brought on by the massive release of endorphins trig-
gered by the capsaicin. 
 It might turn out that Sharon has unusually sensitive tissue, though this 
needn’t be the case. More importantly, because many people in many cultures 
across the globe become so desensitized to capsaicin that they actively seek out 
its pungency, we would still want to know what other factors figure in Sharon’s 
negative response. When we learn that she dislikes ginger, cilantro, and a vari-
ety of other spices and condiments, that she finds no appreciable difference 
between butter and margarine, and that she finds soy milk perfectly palatable, 
it begins to look like her aversion to capsicum is part of a larger repertoire of 
food likes and dislikes. In fact, her tastes in food are closely related, as are all 
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of ours, to a particular individual history that is unique, even when compared 
to other members of the family. 
 Like color recognition, taste is a mental act in the sense that it involves not 
merely whatever chemical events take place in the mouth, but also a sorting of 
the taste into multiple categories, which are themselves established by com-
munities of tasters who enforce the local norms by pronouncing on the loca-
tion of a given bite within the operative categories: “Too spicy,” “bland,” 
“sweet,” “not salty enough,” etc. Th ey are, in other words, made possible by the 
complex holism of the mental in which judgments, intentions, beliefs, and 
desires all hang together. Because the standards by which we make our par-
ticular judgments have a history to ourselves we “do not have, and cannot 
expect to find, a way of mapping events described in the physical vocabulary 
onto events described in the mental vocabulary” (Davidson 2001: 127). 
 A more general, and perhaps more bold, way to make this point is to agree 
with Davidson’s qualified statement that “there is no such a thing as a lan-
guage . . . if a language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists 
have supposed” (Davidson 2005: 109-110). What he means is that in learning 
a language we do not acquire a single ability, shared with other speakers of the 
same language, to formulate and use tokens, whether verbal or written, created 
to conform to “a precise and specifiable set of syntactic and semantic rules” 
(Davidson 2005: 110). What we learn through mimicry, repetition, and disci-
pline is an idiolect with which we negotiate our interactions with other people 
in the world around us. It turns out that we’re usually successful because we 
talk more or less the same way that everybody around us does, but that doesn’t 
mean that we are judged by the language, or that there is “a socially accepted 
way” of talking to which we must conform (cf. Davidson 2005: 118). Th e 
only thing communication requires is that my audience takes what I say in the 
way I intend them to. 
 Davidson’s point here is that if there is no single, formal, thing that all 
 talkers are required to have in order to be understood as English, Spanish, or 
Bantu speakers, there is nothing philosophically interesting to be discovered 
in the projects of linguists, cognitive scientists, or workers in artificial intel-
ligence. Th is isn’t to say that their projects won’t facilitate the production of 
some really interesting machines. It’s just that the formal languages, if we want 
to call them that, which are essential to programming those machines, are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for ordinary human talking. “Mutual under-
standing,” Davidson writes, “is achieved through the exercise of  imagination, 
appeal to general knowledge of the world, and awareness of human interests 
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and attitudes” (Davidson 2005: 110). After that it’s triangulation, all the way 
down. 
 Of course, Davidson hastens to point out, the reason mature speakers of the 
language carry out this triangulation with such swift ease is that they have 
learned to use words, phrases, and “syntactical devices” in pretty much the 
same ways as the other people with whom they desire to communicate. But 
“pretty much” should be taken as a technical term, implying that we have little 
or no reason to believe that there is a single, well-formulated, systematically 
understood, thing called “language” which is shared by the majority of Eng-
lish, Spanish, or Bantu-speakers. It’s a safe bet that there will be substantial 
variation in how and when different people use phrases such as “that’s spicy,” 
“he’s hot,” “chartreuse,” “stool,” and as many other words and phrases as any-
one cares to consider. Because people learn to use their language in various, 
sometimes unpredictable ways, to serve purposes that are always subject to 
revision and change, there will never be a single complete theory for a human 
language. Even if there were, successful communication would still need imag-
ination, knowledge, and “awareness of human interests and attitudes.” 
 Cognitive Science and the Study of Religion 
 It is surely possible to allow, as Davidson does, that human beings are material 
creatures, through and through. Davidson insists, in fact, that “there are causal 
relations between events described as physical and events described as mental” 
(Davidson 2005: 204). Yesterday I finished the last piece of candy on my desk. 
A short while later I went to the grocery where, on my way down the aisle, I 
thought I might try sour gummy worms because they would look festive. So I 
picked some up, put them in the cart, and earlier today I dumped a bag into 
the receptacle on my desk. But, Davidson also insists, “there are no strict laws 
relating events under physical descriptions with events under mental descrip-
tions” (Davidson 2005: 204). Davidson maintains this second point because, 
as we’ve seen, it is impossible to eliminate the normative component from our 
talk of rational action. Churchland asks us to “consider a familiar example: a 
ripe peach, bitten into and savored. As the juice hits the receptors on the 
tongue, it affects their levels of excitation . . . Any peach, at a comparable stage 
of maturity, will produce almost exactly the same pattern of activation” 
(Churchland 1995: 21- 22). Even if we grant him the validity of this point and 
everything else about vector coding and processing in neural networks, what 
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counts as “ripe” and what the biter does as a result of all those excited recep-
tors, will elude him.9 We are all, at least potentially, like the capsicum sensitive 
Sharon or Fuschia Dunlop’s Chinese chefs. 
 Th e short route to a conclusion about what cognitive science can tell us 
about religion, then, might be to examine the index. If you find therein much 
mention of “folk psychology,” “cognitive systems,” “formation rules,” and the 
like then we might as well “commit it then to the flames; for it can contain 
nothing but sophistry and illusion” (Hume 1902: 165). But that seems unfair. 
We ought at least to take a look at one example. Fortunately, over the last 
couple of decades Th omas Lawson and Robert McCauley have collaborated 
on an approach to religion that relies heavily on cognitive science. Rather than 
survey the entire corpus, I shall concentrate on their first collaborative volume, 
from 1990, and their more recent volume, which appeared in 2002. If, as I 
will argue, the first has serious flaws which are repeated in the more recent 
work, this would seem to count as a degenerate research program, with little 
claim on our continued interest. 
 It’s worth noting at the outset those areas where I do not think I disagree 
with Lawson and McCauley. In chapter one of Rethinking Religion they reject 
both the “protectionist” strategy that insulates religion from critical analysis 
and the “reductionist” impulse that the only explanation of religion is one that 
can boil it down to nothing more than a by-product of social or psychological 
forces. Th e former they identify in Eliade and Otto (McCauley & Lawson 
1990: 13-14), but it goes back at least to Schleiermacher’s Speeches and the 
claim that religion “stops with the immediate experiences of the existence and 
action of the universe, with the individual intuitions and feelings; each of 
these is a self-contained work without connections with others or dependence 
upon them” (Schleiermacher 1996: 26).10 
 9  I am not saying that we could not learn to speak a language in which talking about what we 
see, taste, and smell in terms of “neural networks.” But to be adequate for discussing the full 
spectrum of human acts and emotions it would need to duplicate our current mental language 
as well. But this would reproduce the problem of norms and reasons and as a result wouldn’t be 
much of an improvement. If it left out the mental, then perhaps it could be formulated in terms 
of strict laws, but they wouldn’t be laws that could explain rational human actions. I take it that 
this is Davidson’s point when he writes that, “I can imagine a science concerned with how people 
think and act purged of ‘folk psychology’, but I cannot think in what its interest would consist” 
(Davidson 2001: 25). 
10  Schleiermacher comes in for considerable criticism by Otto (1950), but that shouldn’t 
obscure the unity of their interests as opposed to the rambunctious and anti-religious empiricism 
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 While the principal target of Schleiermacher’s On Religion is the critical 
philosophy of Kant, Hume stands, if ambivalently, in the background.11 Th e 
conclusion to the first Inquiry, which I paraphrased above, is directed as much 
against the theologians as the metaphysicians, despite the seeming toleration 
of Divinity that precedes it. Hume’s disdain for religion received public notice 
from the 1740s on and there is no reason not to take Philo’s pronouncement 
on the “religious spirit” that “no time can be happier or more prosperous than 
those in which it is never regarded or heard of” (Hume 1998: 82), as that of 
Hume himself.12 Despite his seeming concession to believers, who are not in 
conflict with science because “the sentences which the theist uses to express 
such ‘truths’ are not literally significant” (Ayer 1946: 118), I take A. J. Ayer to 
be the direct descendant of Hume when he concludes that: 
 Th e fact that people have religious experiences is interesting from the psychological 
point of view, but it does not in any way imply that there is such a thing as religious 
knowledge . . . those philosophers who fill their books with assertions that they intui-
tively “know” this or that moral or religious “truth” are merely providing material for 
the psycho-analyst (1946: 119-120). 
 Likeminded contemporaries are legion. Th ey continue to embarrass their 
more thoughtful colleagues in the sciences by decrying the fact that well-
credentialed scientists continue to believe in God. Among students of religion, 
Hans Penner seems to represent this tradition, at least when he writes that 
“Once we reject the theory of the “given” . . . we are forced back to a  fundamental 
principle—sentence meaning is literal meaning. Adopting that principle from 
within a holistic theory, we can conclude that myth and ritual do indeed entail 
that characterizes the tradition from Hume to Ayer. Karl Barth recognized this continuity when, 
as a student in Berlin, he bought himself “a copy of Schleiermacher’s Speeches on Religion to its 
Cultured Despisers, in the edition by R. Otto, which I still use. Eureka! Having apparently sought 
for “Th e Immediate,” I had now found it” (Barth 1991: 68). I take Otto’s criticisms of Schleier-
macher to be of the same, internecine sort as Eliade’s criticisms of Otto, which begin Th e Sacred 
and the Profane (Eliade 1959: 8-10). 
11  Mossner reports that Hume’s Collected Works were published in Germany in 1754-56 and 
that “when J. A. Trinius’s Freydenker Lexicon was published in Leipzig in 1759, five pages were 
devoted to the bibliography of David Hume and the replies to him (Mossner 1954: 227-228). 
Haman, according to Richard Popkin, became so excited on reading Hume’s Dialogues concern-
ing Natural Religion, that “he translated the first and last dialogues into German so that Imman-
uel Kant might read them and become a serious Christian” (Hume 1998: xv). Whatever he knew 
of Hume’s work directly, Schleiermacher was aware of Jacobi’s David Hume on Belief; or Idealism 
and Realism (Schleiermacher 1996: xxiii-xxiv). 
12  I have tried to elaborate the ironic reading of Dialogues XII in Davis (1992). 
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information and the information is false” (Frankenberry 2002: 169).13 Not 
only Sellars’s attack on “the given,” but the various critiques of empiricist pre-
suppositions that run from Peirce and James, through Wittgenstein, to Quine, 
Goodman, and recent historians of science make it a matter of philosophical 
common sense to reject both sides of this question. 
 I’m also not going to question the various psychological experiments retailed 
by Lawson and McCauley, particularly in the more recent work (though I 
imagine I have a rather different take on their importance). Even the distinc-
tion between “interpretation” and “explanation,” which drives the project, is 
one I can share, with only the addition of “description” as part of any approach 
to the study of human phenomena. But, on the basis of Bringing Ritual to 
Mind, this would seem to be a friendly addition, since they are happy to accept 
Fredrik Barth’s presentation of Baktaman ritual at face value while disputing, 
at the level of explanation, whether the relevant forces are social or psycho-
logical. My only concern is with the insights provided by McCauley and Lar-
son’s approach to ritual. 
 In attempting to articulate a cognitive approach to religion, and specifically 
religious ritual, McCauley and Lawson emphasis the “analogy with language” 
and argue for “the promise of the competence approach to theorizing as 
a means of generating theories for the study of religious ritual systems—
looking at the work of Chomsky and Sperber for inspiration” (McCauley and 
Lawson 1990: 170-171). By the “competence approach” they mean formulat-
ing and testing “theories about the cognitive representations that an idealized 
participant’s implicit knowledge about such systems suggests” (McCauley and 
Lawson 1990: 2). Such systems characteristically: 1) “Involve symbolic phe-
nomena;” 2) “are usually not explicitly codified;” 3) “are relatively restricted 
both in their use and in their transmission;” 4) “typically, are not explicitly 
taught;” and 5) “require that participants must have some form of explicit 
knowledge” (McCauley and Lawson 1990: 2-3). Th e goal is to make this 
knowledge explicit. Th ey do so by attempting to specify the building blocks of 
a language and the rules that must go into the regular production of well-
formed instances of linguistic behavior. Th e idea goes back at least to Chom-
sky’s famous review of Skinner’s Verbal Behavior (Chomsky 1959). 
13  I qualify my inclusion of Penner here because it is unclear what the scope of “entail” is in 
this passage. If all he means is that on Davidson’s way of accounting for meaning, people should 
mostly be taken to believe what they say they believe in, I take it that we agree. But no reasonable 
semantic theory, and certainly not Davidson’s approach to language, can entail that any particu-
lar beliefs, or the sentences by which people communicate them, are false. 
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 While McCauley and Lawson don’t argue the point, Chomsky’s thesis rests 
on the systematic critique of the theoretical adequacy of the entire vocabulary 
of behaviorism. Th us, “We are no doubt to interpret the terms ‘strength’ and 
‘probability’ in this context as paraphrases of more familiar locutions such as 
‘justified belief ’ or ‘warranted assertability’ . . . or that ‘our belief in what some-
one tells us is similarly a function of, or identical with, our tendency to act 
upon the verbal stimuli which he provides’” (Chomsky 1959: 35). Th ese and 
other functional equivalents result in the original linguistic products losing 
whatever claim on objectivity they appeared to carry (Chomsky 1959: 36). 
While “reinforcement” and the rest of the conceptual arsenal Skinner deploys 
are “important factors” in language acquisition, Chomsky insists that they are 
inadequate without understanding “the remarkable capacity of the child to 
generalize, hypothesize, and ‘process information’ in a variety of very special 
and apparently highly complex ways which we cannot yet describe or begin 
to understand, and which may be largely innate, or may develop through 
some sort of learning or through maturation of the nervous system” (Chom-
sky 1959: 43). Th ese innate processing abilities become the object of Chom-
sky’s subsequent research program. Th e formal models of deep structure are 
supposed to represent the processes, presumably instantiated in some sort of 
neural matrix, which make language acquisition and use possible. McCauley 
and Lawson’s embrace of this program, at least in its broadest outlines, stretches 
from their early work to their most recent, where they reaffirm that “the forces 
on which we are concentrating are psychological rather than social” (2002: 72-
73) and that the explanation of these psychological forces is ultimately to be 
found in “the possible neural underpinnings for such a system” (2002: 77). 
 Until those neural underpinnings are disclosed by the march of neurosci-
ence, investigators must content themselves with constructing ever more sub-
tle models that can be tested for their adequacy in displaying those neural 
systems. Th is is the role played by the various figures and formation rules that 
first appear in chapter five of Rethinking Religion. A rather different sort of 
figure predominates in Bringing Ritual to Mind, but the point is the same: To 
give visual form to psychic processes which are ultimately rooted in the neuro-
biology of the human mind. In this, as they readily admit, McCauley and 
Lawson are following the methodological lead of Churchland and likeminded 
philosophers (McCauley and Lawson 1990: 145). But while the neurology 
may be in the future, McCauley and Lawson think that the application of this 
method to religious ritual yields some interesting results. 
 As they present it, “the conceptual system of the religion stipulates what will 
count as appropriate ritual acts and what entities constitute possible ritual 
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agents and possible ritual objects” (McCauley and Lawson 1990: 162). What-
ever their specific properties, it is crucial to properly religious ritual that the 
central players be superhuman agents.14 Th e relative distance of the CPS-
agents from a particular ritual type influences intensity, repeatability, and 
revisability. Th ey identify a number of universals, both substantive and func-
tional, and apply the whole to several disparate rituals. 
 Th e problem, of course, is determining whether any of this actually throws 
light on the sorts of phenomena students and philosophers of religion are 
actually interested in. It is not clear to me that their figures illustrate much 
beyond what could be gleaned from a simple description of the rituals them-
selves, but that may just be a failure on my part. Th e more important question 
is whether, even if we accept the centrality of CPS-agents, they identify 
any constraints on religious ritual that go beyond the common sense gen-
eralizations available to any student of the rituals discussed. To the extent 
that McCauley and Lawson embrace the method and presuppositions of 
Churchland, they will also have the difficulty with the normative component 
of propositional attitudes. One consequence of this, as noted above, will be an 
inescapably historical component to the complete account (assuming that 
there is a complete account) of a particular ritual within a particular tradition. 
Th is, in turn, puts a serious constraint upon the generalizability of the theory. 
In other words, their account will always have to include the caveat, “this is a 
general theory of religious ritual except for those parts that are historically 
unique to the particular practice of particular rituals at particular times.” Th is, 
I take it, makes the purported theory less than compelling. 
 It seems, at least at one point, that McCauley and Lawson are aware of 
the problem, for in discussing a set of Zulu rituals they note that “Since the 
time of Shaka a young man could not marry until the formation of his 
regiment during the ukubuthwa. Apparently, Shaka introduced this ritual in 
order to supersede the rituals of the earlier circumcision lodges and to circum-
ven thereby the distractions from military responsibilities those rituals pro-
voked” (1990: 117). Th ey go on to predict the weak status of the CPS-agent, 
“his ritual is unlikely to be a fundamental ritual in the Zulu religious system” 
(1990: 121). Not only does this tacitly import a normative judgment that is 
otherwise unjustified, but it misses the more important implication of the 
14  In Bringing Ritual to Mind they explicate the social origins of specific traditions by intro-
ducing the phrase “culturally postulated superhuman agents (CPS-agents hereafter)” (McCauley 
and Lawson 2002: 8) and I will use their abbreviation henceforth. 
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example. If it is possible to reorganize a ritual system for local purposes, moti-
vated by non-religious goals, and have that ritual become any persistent part 
of the tradition—Shaka died, after all, in 1828—then any purported univer-
sals constrain ritual only in the weakest possible way. Again, this doesn’t rec-
ommend the proposal as having much by way of explanatory force. 
 But Lawson and McCauley have a more serious problem in their recent 
work. Bringing Ritual to Mind opens with the acknowledgement that “the 
critical test of any theory’s sturdiness is its ability to stand up to the empirical 
evidence” (2002: x). Th e competition against which they pit their approach is 
the ethnography of Fredrik Barth and Harvey Whitehouse, both of whom 
worked in New Guinea, though with communities separated by both time 
and distance.15 While the attempt to apply their approach to new cultures and 
to test it against alternative readings is surely laudable, they not only fail to 
confront the theoretical problem of unpredictable local innovation, their 
interest in deploying psychological theory leads them to misrepresent the 
issues posed by cargo cults and other millenarian movements. 
 Chapter 27 of Barth’s Ritual and Knowledge among the Baktaman takes up 
the question of innovation in Baktaman practice. He identifies nine instances 
of attempted innovation, three during the time of his fieldwork “and all of 
them have taken place within the memory of [his informant] Ngromnok, i.e. 
over the last c. 20 years” (Barth 1975: 240). McCauley and Lawson refer to 
this passage twice (2002: 71 & 83), but they clearly do not think that the 
details have any theoretical bearing on their work. But the attempted innova-
tions, and Barth’s comments, are telling. A particularly interesting one  concerns 
an “attempt to change the rules ragarding wild male pig.” Barth writes that: 
 Baktaman taboos are particularly restrictive in limiting such meat to 7th grade initi-
ates; all western neighbors allow it from 4th grade. About 10 years ago a group of 
15  Barth’s work with the Baktaman, a group numbering less than 200, living in the central 
mountain range of New Guinea, goes back to 1967-1968 (Barth 1975: 6-27). Whitehouse 
worked in the northeastern section of the island of New Britain, to the east of New Guinea. His 
time among the Pomio and Baining stretched from 1987 to 1989 (Whitehouse 1995: 1-13). 
It is only appropriate to note that McCauley and Lawson devote a considerable amount of 
their discussion to Barth’s later, more theoretical reflections on his fieldwork, Cosmologies in the 
Making: A Generative Approach to Cultural Variation in Inner New Guinea. I’ve already noted, 
however, that McCauley and Lawson contrast their “psychological” approach to Barth’s “social” 
one (2002: 72-73), so Barth’s account does not have the same relation to Davidson’s anomalous 
monism as McCauley and Lawson’s neuro-cognitivism. 
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Baktaman novices, visiting the village of the Wokfiakmin to the S.W. for 4th degree 
initiations, adopted the local rules and ate wild male pig when they were there. Subse-
quent to their return to Baktaman, the taro failed; and Baktaman seniors see this as 
vindication that the taboo is the will of their ancestors, though other ancestors are 
different (1975: 240). 
 Th ere are three points to note here. First, Barth notes that despite the  Baktaman 
insistence on the restriction that “there does not seem to be anything particu-
larly apposite about associating the beast with the Amowkam, and rather better 
reason to connect a man’s competence to eat it with his ascent to full virility at 
4th degree Mafom initiation” (1975: 240). Th e neighbors eat; the Baktaman 
don’t. Th ere is no structural or symbolic reason not to. Th ere is precedent for 
allowing it. Whatever the reason, beyond “the ancestors said so,” it seems to be 
part of lost local history and irrelevant to the then current practice. 
 Second, had the group in question had a different makeup, or visited at a 
different time, there is no reason to believe the issue would have been raised 
when it was. Seventh degree Baktaman initiates would have eaten and would 
not necessarily have had any reason to push for a change in the rules. Th e rule 
might have remained in place, but only as a result of the accidents of time and 
travel; ritual diagrams such as those provided in Rethinking Religion would 
have had no explanatory import one way or another. 
 Finally, had the taro not failed, we would have had no sure knowledge of 
what might have happened. Th e elders might have put forward another reason 
to restrict the consumption of wild male pig, the lower degree initiates might 
have succeeded in making the change and preserving it, or the change might 
have been made and later rescinded. Another attempted innovation shows 
that the last is at least an option. Th eir western neighbors believe that various 
white worms and grubs: 
 are bad for first degree novices; but the Baktaman taboo extends till 6th degree. Th ere 
was recently a major move among young men to change this by adopting the western 
fashion and many men of the (b) set started eating such grubs, which are regarded as 
a delicacy; but the worms subsequently attacked the taro and the taboo was reinstated 
(1975: 241). 
 Presumably, had the taro not been attacked, the innovation could have stood. 
As it happens, one of the innovations that did become permanent involved 
6th degree initiation. Kimebnok, the cult leader, “argued persistently that he 
wanted to ‘show’ the novice set as much as possible, while most of the seniors 
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strongly advocated the more exclusive style” (1975, 91). Kimebnok prevailed, 
despite the fact that this seems to be the sort of CPS-agent ritual with high 
sensory pageantry that McCauley and Lawson suggest should be compara-
tively difficult to change.16 
 Barth concludes that “the purported criteria by which innovations are eval-
uated by the Baktaman seem to be pragmatic” (1975: 244). Whether they 
recognize the problem or not, McCauley and Lawson cannot agree with Barth. 
If both innovations and objections are pragmatic, then the constraints on rit-
ual form are neither neurological nor universal. But without the claim to some 
degree of universality, grounded in basic human neurology, the claim that they 
are pursuing “scientific explanation” (1990: 26) of the phenomena of religion 
falls flat. Since Barth’s assessment seems to be born out by the facts, I’m afraid 
that McCauley and Lawson are in trouble. 
 Still more problems loom when they turn to Whitehouse, whose study 
focuses on a splinter group of the Mali Baining in eastern New Britain, “virtu-
ally all of whom were members of the Pomio Kivung” (Whitehouse 1995: 6). 
“Pomio Kivung” means “meeting of the Pomio people,” a generic name for 
various peoples of south-west New Britain, though it “is a larger phenomenon 
than its name suggests. In addition to its many Pomio supporters, it has loyal 
followers to the north, extending deeply among the Mali Baining” (1995: 1). 
According to Whitehouse’s sources, the movement dates back to 1963, with 
the emergence of a divine leader, Michael Koriam Urekit, who seems to have 
combined aspects of earlier millenarian movements or “cargo cults” with grass-
roots political activism, particularly directed to achieving local self-government. 
“Th e anticipated arrival of self-government,” writes Whitehouse: 
 has always been construed as an essentially supernatural event. Th e ‘government’ itself 
is said to exist already on a transcendental plane. In the early days of the movement it 
seems that this government was referred to as the ‘Ancestral Council’ (Kaunsel Tum-
buna), but by the time of my fieldwork in the 1980s it was generally known as the 
‘Village Government’ (Vilij Gavman) (1995: 41-43). 
16  Th e qualifications here are intended to register my uncertainty about what ultimately 
counts as an agent, patient, or instrument, for McCauley and Lawson. In the interest of space 
and time I have left out these distinctions and the way they work in the theory. In part, I confess, 
I do so because ploys such as the “object agency filter” (1990: 88) seem to me ad hoc creations 
designed to protect some component of the theory. Th is is a sign of a degenerate research pro-
gram. But little rests on whether 6th degree initiation is agent, patient, or instrument ritual; the 
main criticism remains the inability of the theory to deal with innovation in a credible way. 
226 G. S. Davis / Method and Th eory in the Study of Religion 19 (2007) 200-231
 Th e Village Government is expected to arrive at some, not too distant, 
moment, at which time full autonomy will be established and good things will 
flow to the people from “foreign investors” who will be the ancestors disguised 
as Europeans (1995: 43). 
 Shortly before the arrival of Whitehouse and his wife, a movement had 
arisen among the Mali Baining that proclaimed the imminent arrival of the 
Village Government and the need of the people to prepare for this transform-
ing event. McCauley and Lawson focus on the ritual innovations introduced 
by the leaders of this movement during its brief life, between August 1987 and 
October 1988, after which the members of the group were reabsorbed into the 
mainstream of Mali Baining Pomio Kivung. McCauley and Lawson investi-
gate “the evolution of the overall ritual system of the Dadul-Maranagi splinter 
group” in order to demonstrate “that—unlike the ritual frequency hypothe-
sis—the ritual form hypothesis not only correctly predicts the ritual arrange-
ments . . . it also makes some sense of the underlying evolutionary trends” 
(2002: 157-158). In particular, they argue that a system such as the main-
stream Povio Kivung, which rely on the frequent and regular repetition of 
rituals low in excitement and “sensory pageantry” is “an unbalanced system. 
Sooner or later such systems will induce boredom. Such ritual tedium will 
provoke creative reactions sufficient to spring ritual systems out of this posi-
tion. Th ose reactions will generate enough energy to break the ritual systems 
free from the first attractor [frequency]” (2002: 184). Put simply, but not, I 
hope, unfairly, the thesis is that the low key frequency of Povio Kivung ritual 
tripped the “tedium effect,” which led to the rise of the splinter group. In order 
to break free from the boredom of the mainstream system, the leaders of the 
break away group introduced new and even more frequent rituals which, con-
trary to Whitehouse’s theory, also increased in sensory pageantry. Unlike 
Whitehouse, McCauley and Lawson predict that the emotional excitement 
necessary to break out from boredom requires a rise in ever more intense “spe-
cial agent rituals.” Th e failure of the ancestors to appear provokes ever more 
intense new rituals until the situation breaks the “sensory overload ceiling. 
Th ere seems no doubt,” they write: 
 that this is just where the Dadul-Maranagi splinter group was heading, but external 
intervention precipitated the group’s crash not long before it would have punctured 
the sensory overload ceiling. Our suggestion is that even if the government health 
inspector had not intervened, the psychological dynamics we have discussed reveal 
how the internal developments of the Dadul-Maranagi splinter group would have 
produced the same result anyway (2002: 194-195). 
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 McCauley and Lawson conclude that theirs is the stronger theory. 
 Th at so much of this rests on speculation and stipulation is problematic 
enough, but I want to focus on an apparent confusion about what explains 
what. Consider the following remark, which has McCauley and Lawson trying 
to put the 1987-1988 incident into the larger context of recurrent enthusias-
tic17 movements among the Povio Kivung. “Apparently, during each of these 
episodes the salient goal was to entice the ancestors’ return. For the two of 
these episodes for which Whitehouse provides detailed information about 
the evolution of ritual patterns, the pivotal new special agent ritual, viz., the 
vigil, ends up being repeated because of the ancestors’ refusal to cooperate” 
(2002: 197). All of the activities of the splinter group are undertaken either at 
the insistence of the ancestors or in response to their failure to respond. White-
house’s account suggests that not only the rituals, but the surrounding actions 
as well, are responses to demoralization, anxiety, and unexpected events. Th us 
Whitehouse writes that, “at the end of August 1988 Baninge told me that 
demoralization could destroy the splinter group unless a credible programme 
to prepare for the ancestors was set in motion” (Whitehouse 1995: 129). In 
response to the possession of Lagawop, the third week in September, “a secret 
meeting occurred in Baninge’s father’s house . . . Th ere was a general feeling 
that she may be suffering from Satanic delusions” (1995: 147). Just a week 
before the movement was dispersed by the health inspector, Whitehouse’s 
“interviews with almost every adult in Dadul that day revealed that the people 
were frightened to risk exclusion from the miracle now that they had invested 
so many resources in the pursuit of it” (1995: 149). If Whitehouse’s reports are 
correct, it is not clear what role McCauley and Lawson’s theory has in explain-
ing events. More to the point, they do not seem to notice that the reason they 
report for the rituals, together with Whitehouse’s ethnography, constitute by 
themselves an alternative explanation for the evolution, such as it is, of splinter 
group ritual. Exactly why Tatonka and Baninge, the leaders of the movement, 
17  I use this term in its technical sense as “a label for a tendency . . . to be more attentive to the 
guidance (directly felt, they would tell you) of the Holy Spirit . . . Always the first fervours evapo-
rate; prophecy dies out, and the charismatic is merged in the institutional. ‘Th e high that proved 
too high, the heroic for earth too hard’—it is a fugal melody that runs through the centuries” 
(Knox 1950: 1). In addition to Knox, it’s worth reading Worsley (1957), Burridge (1960, 1969), 
Cohn (1970), Gager (1975), and McGinn (1979) for reflections on millenarian and related 
movements by Bible scholars and historians of medieval and early modern Christianity, in addi-
tion to anthropologists working in Melanesia. Whitehouse cites a few more recent studies; 
McCauley and Lawson do not. 
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emerged when they did may be uncertain, but nothing suggests boredom as a 
cause or motive.18  
 Conclusion 
 If the work of Donald Davidson is “post-analytic,” and if this “post-analytic” 
turn is to have any import for students of religion, then it should it should 
have some strong implications for the ways in which religion can and should 
be studied. I have argued that Davidson’s argument for the primacy of the 
ideolect implies not just that radical translation begins at home, but that our 
account of action and rationality will always involve norms that are locally 
learned. Th is leads directly to anomalous monism which, in turn, suggests 
serious limits for any universal science of the mind. Almost 40 years ago Quine 
wrote, in response to Chomsky, that: 
 Chomsky rightly notes my penchant for innate ideas. Rightly, anyway, if we construe 
‘innate ideas’ in terms of innate dispositions to overt behavior . . . Language aptitude is 
innate; language learning, on the other hand, in which that aptitude is put to work, 
turns on intersubjectively observable features of human behavior and its environing 
circumstances, there being no innate language and no telepathy (Davidson & Hin-
tikka 1969: 306). 
 Davidson agrees, adding only that observing something to be human behavior 
itself requires having learned language from at least one other person and thus 
being in a position to attempt, using your own norms, to discern those of 
another in action and speech. Th is, in turn, means admitting there is no neu-
tral vantage point from which questions of norms can be avoided. 
 Not only Chomsky’s, but other attempts, such as that of Churchland, to 
escape the norms we bring to interpretation will either end up smuggling 
those norms in the back door or contenting themselves with findings that 
aren’t of much interest in interpreting most human activities. Th is extends, 
18  In fact, the precipitating event seems to have been Tanotka’s illness, brought on “while 
participating in a small drinking party” (Whitehouse 1995: 90). He goes to Baninge’s house 
because Baninge is his “classificatory brother” and Baninge’s diagnosis of possession results from 
his interpretation of Tanotka’s ramblings (Whitehouse 1995: 91). Th is is not to say that I am 
endorsing Whitehouse’s emphasis on “routinization.” At least some of the historians who test 
Whitehouse’s approach against their own research find his theory suspect (see Whitehouse & 
Martin 2004: chaps. 8 & 9). 
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finally, to the “cognitivism” of McCauley and Lawson. Where they  occasionally 
have something interesting to say, their cognitivism doesn’t figure in; where it 
does, what they say has, at best, not much to contribute and, at its worst, 
blinds them to the relevant evidence. Th at they continue to refine their posi-
tion, despite the limited results, is the sign of a degenerate research program. 
Th is, I submit, gives us little incentive to continue monitoring their results. 
 If reading Davidson, or any thinker, provides compelling grounds for free-
ing ourselves from the compulsion to read everything, so much the better. Th is 
is real progress. Of course, I haven’t provided an alternative theory or method 
for studying religion; I’m not sure I have one, beyond the pragmatic pluralism 
that enjoins us to read anything that seems promising and to pursue any 
vein that might have a chance of furthering the path of inquiry. But elaborat-
ing that particular stance is beyond the scope of the present project. 
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